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大卫·李嘉图:政治经济学及赋税原理·摘录 330
大卫·李嘉图《政治经济学及赋税原理》· On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation · 投资
I have already attempted to shew, that the market price of corn, would, under an increased demand from the effects of a bounty, exceed its natural price, till the requisite additional supply was obtained, and that then it would again fall to its natural price. But the natural price of corn is not so fixed as the natural price of commodities; because, with any great additional demand for corn, land of a worse quality must be taken into cultivation, on which more labour will be required to produce a given quantity, and the natural price of corn would be raised. By a continued bounty, therefore, on the exportation of corn, there would be created a tendency to a permanent rise in the price of corn, and this, as I have shewn elsewhere,[39] never fails to raise rent. Country gentlemen then have not only a temporary but a permanent interest in prohibitions of the importation of corn, and in bounties on its exportation; but manufacturers have no permanent interest in a bounty on the exportation of commodities, their interest is wholly temporary.
出处:
https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/33310
定位:Excerpt 330 · 核对日期:2026-10-19 · 核验:短摘录
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李嘉图论证,出口补贴导致需求增加时,谷物的市场价格会超过自然价格,直到额外供给出现,然后回落到自然价格。但谷物的自然价格不像一般商品那样固定,因为需求大增会迫使耕种更差的土地,需要更多劳动,从而抬高自然价格。因此,持续的出口补贴会趋向于永久提高谷物价格,进而提高地租。地主阶级因此对禁止谷物进口和出口补贴有永久利益,而制造商对商品出口补贴只有暂时利益。核心是,农业补贴会通过地租机制让地主长期受益。
上下文
李嘉图在《政治经济学及赋税原理》中讨论谷物出口补贴对地租和不同阶级利益的影响。
今日一问
为什么农业保护政策往往让地主长期受益,而制造业补贴只是短期?这对今天的农业政策有何启示?
公版作品;原文逐字取自 Project Gutenberg,仅摘录段落并附全书链接。
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