投资 · 西方古典
弗雷德里克·巴斯夏:经济诡辩·摘录 100
弗雷德里克·巴斯夏《经济诡辩》· Economic Sophisms · 投资
Or again, the State might levy a tax of five francs from the public, and give the proceeds as a premium to the ironmaster. The protective effect would be the same. Foreign iron would in this case be equally excluded; for our ironmaster can now sell his iron at seven francs, which, with the five francs premium, would make up to him the remunerative price of twelve francs. But with home iron at seven francs the foreigner could not sell his for eight, which by the supposition is his lowest remunerative price.
出处:
https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/44145
定位:Excerpt 100 · 核对日期:2026-10-19 · 核验:短摘录
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第二种办法:国家向公众征5法郎税,把钱作为补贴发给铁老板。保护效果一样:外国铁照样被排除。因为铁老板现在可以卖7法郎,加上5法郎补贴,仍得12法郎的保本价;而外国铁最低要8法郎才保本,卖7法郎就亏,所以进不来。可见关税和补贴只是形式不同,都是让消费者掏钱、让受保护行业得利。
上下文
巴师夏继续用铁的例子,说明直接补贴与关税产生同样的保护效果。
今日一问
如果补贴和关税效果相同,你为什么可能对其中一个更反感?
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