David Ricardo：On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, Excerpt 332

The sole effect of the bounty either on the exportation of manufactures, or of corn, is to divert a portion of capital to an employment, which it would not naturally seek. It causes a pernicious distribution of the general funds of the society--it bribes a manufacturer to commence or continue in a comparatively less profitable employment. It is the worst species of taxation, for it does not give to the foreign country all that it takes away from the home country, the balance of loss being made up by the less advantageous distribution of the general capital. Thus, if the price of corn is in England 4_l._, and in France 3_l._ 15_s._ a bounty of 10_s._ will ultimately reduce it to 3_l._ 10_s._ in France, and maintain it at the same price of 4_l._ in England. For every quarter exported, England pays a tax of 10_s._ For every quarter imported into France, France gains only 5_s._, so that the value of 5_s._ per quarter is absolutely lost to the world, by such a distribution of its funds as to cause diminished production, probably not of corn, but of some other object of necessity or enjoyment.

Source： https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/33310
Locator：Excerpt 332 · Verified：2026-10-19 · Verification：Short excerpt

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